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NOTES
SALES - PARTIAL OR TOTAL DESTRUCTION OF THE THING
UNDER THE CONTRACT TO SELL
Plaintiff and defendant entered into a written agreement
to sell a house and lot.' As a private sale of succession property,
the agreement was made subject to court approval.2 Prior to the
approval and signing of the act of sale, a substantial portion
of a small flower garden, alleged to be one of the property's
principal attractions, was ruined by a heavy freeze. Thereafter,
court approval of the sale was acquired but the defendant re-
fused to take title to the property. Plaintiff sought specific
performance and, in the alternative, forfeiture of the deposit.
The trial court dismissed the suit and ordered the deposit re-
turned. On appeal, plaintiff abandoned the demand for specific
performance and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal ordered
the deposit forfeited. On certiorari, the Louisiana Supreme
Court reversed. Held, the potential vendee under a contract to
sell subject to a suspensive condition is entitled to have the
agreement dissolved and the deposit returned if the object of
the agreement is partially destroyed after entering the contract
to sell but before fulfillment of the condition. Bornemann v.
Richards, 245 La. 851, 161 So. 2d 741 (1964).
The French Civil Code treated a promise of sale as a
unilateral contract, binding on the promisor but imposing no
obligations upon the promisee. A promise of sale was converted
directly into a completed sale by the reciprocal consent of the
parties to the thing and price, even though the thing had not
yet been delivered nor the price paid.4 Although the Louisiana
Civil Code included a promise of sale in terms taken from the
French Civil Code,5 the law was later amended to state that
upon reciprocal consent the promise of sale so far amounts to
a sale as to give either party the right to demand specific per-
fornance.6 This modification created a new type of agree-
1. Upon entering the contract to sell, the defendant deposited ten percent of
the proposed purchase price. 245 La. at 854, 161 So. 2d at 742.
2. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3281-3285 (1960).
3. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TRF'vrISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE Lou-
ISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) nos. 1400, 1401 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
PLANIOL].
4. FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 1583, 1589.
5. La. Civil Code p. 346, art. 9 (1808), adopted from FRENCH CIVIL CODE
art. 1589.
6. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2462 (1870), as amended by La. Acts 1920, No. 27.
As far as movables are concerned, a contract to sell would be a rare occurrence
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ment- the contract to sell.7 Therefore, in Louisiana, the ac-
ceptance of a promise of sale may, conceptually, convert the
agreement directly into a completed sale, or, as normally done,
convert the promise of sale into a bilateral contract to sell and
thereafter into a completed sale.
Under both Louisiana and French law" a sale formed sub-
ject to a suspensive condition creates a binding bilateral con-
tractY Neither party is privileged to withdraw pending ful-
fillment of the condition; mutual rights and duties exist
although performance of the contract is suspended. When the
condition has been fulfilled, ownership passes and the rights of
the parties are retroactive to the date of the original agree-
ment.10
The Louisiana Civil Code articles relative to partial or total
destruction of the object of the completed sale are based upon
the French Civil Code. The French Civil Code based relief upon
two different theories: that of "cause" and that of "risk fol-
lows ownership." Whenever the object of the sale was partially
or totally destroyed "at the moment of" the sale,1 or when the
as a completed sale is formed whenever there is consent as to the thing and price.
Id. art. 2439. However, if the parties clearly express their intentions, it should
be possible to form an agreement binding upon both parties which is not a com-
pleted sale, but merely looks forward to the subsequently completed sale of the
movable. It appears, though, that this agreement would impose mutual "obliga-
tions to do" upon the parties and therefore damages would be the normal remedy
for default, rather than specific performance. Id. art. 1926.
7. See Smith, An Analytical Discussion of the Promise of Sale and Related
Subjects, Including Earnest Money, 20 LA. L. REV. 522, 529 (1960).
8. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2043, 2044 (1870) deal with the suspensive condition
and were adopted from the FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 1181, 1182. However, courts
have made some minor changes in Louisiana law.
Under French law, the parties may agree to suspend the transfer of ownership
until the price is paid, even though there has been consent as to the thing and
price. The Louisiana Civil Code, with its identical articles, appears to establish
the same law, but jurisprudence has definitely established that Louisiana will not
allow a conditional sale of a movable in which the payment of the price is sus-
pended. See, e.g., Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La.
152, 46 So. 193 (1908).
9. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2028 (1870).
10. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1958-1959 Term-
Particular Contracts, Sales, 20 LA. L. REV. 226, 227 (1960). Professor Smith
notes that a discrepancy appears between the French law and the English trans-
lation. The French version indicates that the obligation exists, but is merely sus-
pended pending the occurrence of the event, while the English translation, as
applied in Zemurray v. Boe, 235 La. 623, 105 So. 2d 243 (1958), suggests that
there is no obligation until the event occurs.
11. The French law holds the sale is null if the thing is totally destroyed,
while if the thing is only partially destroyed, the purchaser has the option either
to abandon the sale or take the thing with diminution of the price. FRENCO CIVIL
CODE art. 1601. From general application of the theory of cause, it follows that
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object of the sale was totally destroyed pending the accomplish-
ment of a suspensive condition to that sale,' 2 then relief was
granted based upon the theory of cause. When the thing was
when the object of the sale is completely destroyed, the principal cause of the
agreement no longer exists and the sale is null. See 11 BEUDANT, COURS DE DROIT
CIVIL FRANVAIS n 74, 75 (2d ed. 1938) [hereinafter cited as BEUDANT]; 9
FENET, RECUEIL COMPLET DES TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES DU CODE CIVIL 157 (1856)
[hereinafter cited as FENET] ; 2 PLANIOL no. 1366. Where the partial destruction
is so insignificant that it might be assumed the buyer would have contracted any-
way, it has been argued that a vigorous application of cause would force the buyer
to accept the thing in its diminished state with a diminution in price. See BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE ET SAIGNAT, TRAITII THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL, DE
LA VENTE ET DE L'ECHANGE no 99 (3d ed. 1908) [hereinafter cited as BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE ET SAIGNAT]. However, the redactors gave the purchaser the
option to annul the contract or take the thing with diminution of price, thus re-jecting a strict application of cause in the case of partial destruction. Further,
the French Civil Code failed to state specifically that the buyer should not be
able to annul the contract unless the cause of the contract had ceased to exist,
thus leading to the argument that any destruction will suffice to allow the buyer
to exercise his option. See 2 PLANIOL no. 1367. But see BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE
ET SAIGNAT no 99; 11 BEUDANT no, 74, 75, which state that the option should not
be allowed for an insignificant partial destruction when the buyer merely wishes
to give up the contract.
The Louisiana law is in accord as this French principle was adopted in LA.
CIVIL CODE art. 2455 (1870) : "If, at the moment of the sale, the thing sold is
totally destroyed, the sale is null; if there is only a part of the thing destroyed,
the purchaser has the choice, either to abandon the sale, or to retain the preserved
part, by having the price thereof determined by appraisement."
The remedies allowed under LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2455 (1870) should apply
only where the parties were unaware of the partial or total destruction of the
thing when they completed the sale. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET SAIGNAT no
99. If, at the time of the sale, the parties were aware of the partial or total de-
struction, then the intention of the parties shall govern and the buyer will not
be allowed to have the contract annulled or the price diminished. See 6 MARCADE,
EXPLICATION THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE CODE CIVIL n 1601 (7th ed. 1875). If
only the seller had knowledge of the destruction, there would almost certainly be
fraud on his part, thus the buyer could be allowed rescission of the contract of
sale due to error. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1847, 1881, 1882 (1870). These remedies
will not be allowed when the thing was destroyed through the fault of one of the
parties. If the thing was destroyed through the fault of the seller, the buyer may
take the thing as is and demand damages, or have the contract annulled. See 9
FENET 157.
It is submitted that these remedies under LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2455 (1870)
should not be limited to the situation where the destruction occurs at the exact
moment of the sale, but should apply any time the parties enter the contract of
sale unaware of the damage to the object of the sale.
12. In both France and Louisiana, although the sale has been completed, until
the suspensive condition contained in the sale has been fulfilled, the vendor is still
the owner of the thing; if the thing is totally destroyed, the cause of the contract
no longer exists and it is said the obligation likewise never existed. See 2 PLANIOL
no. 1350; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2044 (1870) (in part) : "When the obligation has
been contracted on a suspensive condition, the thing, which forms the subject of
the contract, is at the risk of the obligor, until the event which forms the condi-
tion has happened, subject however to the following restrictions and modifications
of his responsibility: If the thing be entirely destroyed, without the fault of the
debtor, the obligation is extinguished .... "
If the fault of one of the parties prevented the contract from forming, then
the other party, who is deprived by such fault of the benefit which he hoped to
receive from the contract, should have the right to obtain damages.
As to partial destruction of the object of the contract of sale subject to a
suspensive condition, see note 15 infra.
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partially or totally destroyed before the completion of the sale,18
when the object of the sale was partially or totally destroyed
after completion of the sale, 14 or when the object of the sale
was partially destroyed pending accomplishment of a suspensive
condition to that sale, 15 the relief was, arguably, based upon
the doctrine that risk follows ownership.
13. In both France and Louisiana, all changes, whether augmentation or re-
pairment, affect the vendor. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2467-2473 (1870) ; Smith, An
Analytical Discussion of the Promise of Sale and Related Subjects, Including
Earnest Money, 20 LA. L. REV. 522, 545 (1960). The doctrine that risk follows
ownership is applicable; the seller still owns the thing and hence the risk is upon
him. Generally, the risk transfers from the seller to the buyer upon completion
of the sale. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2467-2473 (1870). In Louisiana, as far as
movables are concerned, the completion of the sale and the shifting of the risk
occurs when the parties consent to the thing and price, even though the thing has
not yet been delivered nor the price paid. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2456 (1870). From
the terms of the Louisiana Civil Code, it appears the same rules apply to im-
movables, with the additional requirement that the contract be written. See id.
art. 2462. However, the jurisprudence has also required that there be delivery of
the deed before the sale is complete. See, e.g., Legier v. Braughn, 123 La. 463,
49 So. 22 (1909).
When the thing is partially or totally destroyed before the completion of the
sale, and the purchaser is aware of the destruction, but still enters the contract,
the intention of the parties should govern, and he should not be allowed relief
from his agreement.
14. After completion of the sale, the thing sold is at the risk of the buyer
although the thing has not been delivered nor the price paid. See LA. CIVIL CODE
arts. 2456, 2467-2473 (1870). This is simply an application of the principle that
risk follows ownership; the buyer is now the owner of the thing and consequently
bears the risk. It should be noted, however, that even though the sale be com-
plete, if the thing is partially or totally destroyed after the seller is in default for
non-delivery, the seller bears the loss unless it was destroyed by a fortuitous event
which would have also destroyed the thing had the buyer possessed it. Id. art.
2470.
15. If the object of the sale is totally destroyed pending fulfillment of the
suspensive condition, then the cause of the contract no longer exists and the
obligation is extinguished. See note 12 supra.
In relation to partial destruction of the object of the sale prior to fulfillment
of the suspensive condition, Pothier believed that the vendee should suffer in
the same manner he would profit if any argumentation occurred. 1 POTHIER, A
TREATISE ON TILE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS OR CONTRACTS n, 219 (Evan's transl.,
3d Am. ed. 1853) ; 1 POTHIER, TREATISES ON CONTRACTS n 312 (Cushing's transl.
1839). The redactors of the French Civil Code did not adopt this belief, rather
they granted the vendee an option either to annul the contract or take the thing
as is without diminution of tile price. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1182, which now
appears in the Louisiana law as LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2044 (1870): "When the
obligation has been contracted on a suspensive condition, the thing, which forms
the subject of the contract, is at the risk of the obligor, until the event which
forms the condition has happened, subject however to the following restrictions
and modifications of his responsibility:
"If the thing he entirely destroyed, without the fault of the debtor, the obliga-
tion is extinguished.
"If the thing be impaired, without the fault of the debtor, it is at the option
of the creditor, either to dissolve the obligation or to require the thing in the
state in which it is, without diminution of the price.
"If the thing be impaired through the fault of the debtor, the creditor has
the right to dissolve the obligation, or to require tie thing in the state in which
it is with damages."
The granting of the option to the vendee by the redactors of the French Civil
NOTES
However, there exists a situation peculiar to Louisiana in
which the object of the agreement may be partially or totally
destroyed after the formation of a contract to sell but before
completion of the sale. There are no code articles which directly
govern this problem. The closest analogy to existing code ar-
ticles must be drawn with article 2455,16 which applies to de-
struction of the object of the sale at the moment of the sale and
is based upon the principles of cause, and article 2044,1T which
applies if the sale is contracted subject to a suspensive condition
and grants relief mainly upon the principle that risk follows
ownership.
In the instant case, the purchaser desired only to abandon
the contract to sell and recover the deposit. The court, in hold-
ing for the purchaser, seems to have applied article 2455 pri-
marily,18 but stated as a further reason for the annulment of
the contract to sell that the suspensive condition in the agree-
ment brought article 2044 into operation. Pretermitting the
question whether application of either article is proper, it should
be noted that both articles, by their terms, offer the relief the
purchaser desired. However, had the purchaser under the con-
tract to sell desired to take the thing in its diminished state, the
court would have been faced with an important res nova issue.
In the latter situation the two articles offer different remedies:
article 2455 allows the purchaser to take the thing with diminu-
tion of the price, while article 2044 allows the purchaser to take
the thing without diminution of the price. It appears that
Code, which was subsequently adopted into the Louisiana Civil Code, did not
pass without dissent. The argument was raised that the option is inconsistent
with the Code in that the seller is not granted the same option if the object of
the sale increases iii value prior to fulfillment of the condition. 4 MARCADE,
EXPLICATION THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE CODE CIVIL 470 (7th ed. 1873) ; 11
DURANTON, COURS DE DROIT FRANQAIS no, 73-80 (1834). It appears that the
reasoning for the granting of the option was based upon the principle that risk
follows ownership. As the vendor remained owner of the thing until the condi-
tion was fulfilled, it seemed unfair to force the vendee to take the thing if par-
tially destroyed. See 8 FENET 243.
Article 2044 deals with obligations formed subject to a suspensive condition
and is not limited to the contract of sale. Therefore, it should also be applied to
the situation where the parties have entered into a "contract to sell" subject to
an express suspensive condition. Such was the situation in the instant case.
10. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2455 (1870), quoted in note 11 supra.
17. Id. art. 2044, quoted in note 15 8upra.
18. It should be noted that the court allowed the purchaser to annul the con-
tract under LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2455 (1870) when the amount of the partial
destruction was less than one percent of the proposed purchase price. Unless
weight is to be given to the fact that this house was located within the "Garden
District" of New Orleans, it appears the court is not going to require "substan-
tial" destruction in its application of article 2455. See note 11 supra.
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neither the language of the court nor the facts of the instant
case offer a solution to this problem. However, the opinion im-
plies that but for the express suspensive condition- the re-
quirement of court approval - article 2044 would not have been
applicable. Apparently, if the parties had merely agreed to come
together at some future date and deliver title, the court would
have applied article 2455.19
It is submitted that by its terms article 2455 is inapplicable
as direct authority, either for the solution of the instant case, or
for the solution of the related problem in which the purchaser
demands the thing in its diminished state, because in neither
case is there a completed sale. Article 2455 should be applied as
direct authority only when the parties enter into a completed
sale unaware of the partial or total destruction of the object of
the sale. This should include the situation where the parties
entered into a prior contract to sell and then later actually
formed a completed sale unaware of the partial or total destruc-
tion of the thing.20 It is submitted that article 2044 should be
applied to the contract in the instant case as there exists, in fact,
an obligation subject to a suspensive condition- a contract to
sell subject to court approval.
The agreement in the instant case is not the normal contract
to sell in which the parties are merely "looking ahead" to a sale
and which contains no express suspensive condition. The ordi-
nary contract to sell cannot properly be construed as an obliga-
tion subject to a suspensive condition in order to allow direct
application of article 2044, because, properly speaking, a sus-
pensive condition is one which depends "either on a future and
uncertain event, or an event which has actually taken place,
without its being yet known to the parties. '21
19. The court would have done this even though application of article 2455
would have been contrary to the court's express acknowledgment that there is a
difference between the contract to sell and the completed sale, that the Louisiana
Civil Code does not intend the result to be the same for both, that the instant
agreement is a contract to sell, and that article 2455 by its terms deals with
destruction of the object of the contract at the moment of the sale. "It occurs
to us that we are compelled to note the vastly different language used in the
articles pertaining to a promise to sell (looking forward to a future sale) and
in those which permit the dissolution of a completed sale, and to conclude that
because of such differences the redactors of the Code did not intend that the
result in the two situations would be the same." 245 La. at 858, 161 So. 2d
at 744.
20. See note 11 supra.
21. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2043 (1870).
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The court in determining a suitable remedy in the instant
case should also consider the related problem in which the pur-
chaser under a normal contract to sell desires to take the thing
in its diminished state. In determining a suitable remedy for
the related problem, it appears that the same solution is drawn
from two different reasoning processes. It may be reasoned
that a contract concerning the sale of property has been formed
which requires the occurrence of a condition before ownership
may be transferred - the condition being that the parties come
together and transfer title. Thus the contract to sell might be
sufficiently analogous to a contract under a suspensive condition
to justify application of article 2044.22 Also, the court, rather
than applying a code article by analogy, might resolve the prob-
lem under general principles of law. Looking to the substance
of the agreement, it is clear that the vendor under a contract to
sell is still the owner of the thing and therefore he should bear
the risk if any partial or total destruction of the thing occurs
after the contract to sell is formed. This situation is to be dis-
tinguished from the case where the object of the contract was
already partially or totally destroyed before the contract to sell
was formed ;23 in the latter situation the court has granted re-
lief on the basis of cause as reflected in the articles of the Lou-
isiana Civil Code relating to error.2 4 Thus, in the case where
the thing is destroyed during the existence of the contract to sell,
application of the principle that "risk follows ownership" seems
in order, rather than application of the principle of "cause,"
which applies when the thing was destroyed before the forma-
tion of the contract to sell or "at the moment" of a completed
sale. The remedy allowed by the Code under the principle of
"risk follows ownership" permits the purchaser to rescind the
contract or take the thing in its diminished state without reduc-
tion of the price. If the latter remedy be thought too harsh, it
22. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1959-1960 Term-
Particular Contracts, Sale, 21 LA. L. REV. 313 (1961).
23. See Stack v. Irwin, 246 La. 777, 167 So. 2d 363 (1964) where the vendor
and the purchaser entered a contract to sell looking forward to a subsequent sale
of the house. Although the facts are not completely clear, it appears the house
was already "partially destroyed," or contained a defect, before the contract to
sell was formed. The damage was discovered by the purchaser before the sale
was perfected. The court held the determining motive or cause of the purchaser
was to secure a residence so free of substantial defects that no major repairs
would be required. As such, there was error relating to the principal cause of
the contract that warranted a rescission of the contract and a return of the
deposit.
24. LA. CivIL CODE arts. 1820-1849, 1881-1882 (1870).
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must be remembered that the purchaser may always dissolve
the existing contract completely and renegotiate for the dam-
aged property at its true worth.2 5
In order to provide a proper solution for this problem, it is
submitted that legislative action should be taken to define the
consequences of destruction of the thing under a contract to sell.
Alternatively, it is suggested that the courts re-evaluate their
approach to the problem. The theoretical basis for future de-
cisions in this area should be altered in order to preserve sym-
metry in different factual situations, including the case in which
the purchaser under a contract to sell desires to take the par-
tially destroyed thing in its diminished state. Thus, the pur-
chaser under a contract to sell, who seeks relief because the ob-
ject contracted for has been totally or partially destroyed,
should be granted the option either to dissolve the contract or
take the thing in its diminished state at the previously agreed
upon price.
Julian Clark Martin
25. It appears the purchaser would be unable to complete the sale and then
attempt to claim redhibiton because the "defect" in that event would not be
hidden when the sale was completed, since the purchaser previously had knowledge
of the "defect" or destruction. Id. arts. 2520-2523.
The purchaser should not be able to complete the sale and demand reduction
of the price under article 2455 because the purchaser had knowledge of the
partial destruction and the intention of the parties should govern. See note 11
supra.
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